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Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Co. v. EEOC and Sex Discrimination
Under Title VII: Some Questions
Answered, Others Remain
Jane Rigler*
I. Introduction
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 is described generally
as outlawing discrimination in employment based on race, color, sex,
religion, and national origin. Indeed, one of the critical provisions of
the Act specifically provides that it is unlawful for an employer "to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual." 2
American courts have struggled with the question of what it
means to discriminate, not only in the context of Title VII litigation
but also in cases involving the equal protection and due process
clauses of the United States Constitutions and the National Labor
Relations Act." Even when courts have been able to define discrimination, the law has developed in such a fashion that discrimination
against some interests and groups receives a scrutiny different from
similar conduct directed against different groups and interests.'
* Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law. B.A. 1972, University of Iowa; J.D.
1975, Florida State University; LL.M. 1978, New York University.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).

2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1976) (emphasis added).
3. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1976).
5. See, e.g., Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (racial and ethnic distinctions inherently suspect and call for the most exacting judicial examination); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (classification based
on age does not "impermissibly interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right or operate to
the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class"); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (classification involving sex subject to intermediate scrutiny); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)
(disability program which fails to include pregnancy not facially discriminatory against
women); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (state may not deprive dependent illegitimate children of workers' compensation death benefit because of "fundamental
personal rights" endangered by classification and invidiousness of discrimination resting on
"status of birth"); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (strict scrutiny not applicable
to state welfare scheme); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (fundamental right to
travel interstate); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation is fundamental

While the notion of discrimination is central to Title VII, Congress
failed to define the term. The parameters of the Act thus have been
shaped by courts deciding the issue on a piecemeal basis.
Title VII does not distinguish among the types of discrimination
prohibited, and it is logical to assume that all discriminatory employment conduct, whether based on race, color, sex, religion or national
origin, would be analyzed identically. That has not been the case. In
particular, instances of sex discrimination have been treated less generously by the United States Supreme Court than race discrimination cases.' The Court frequently seemed to rely on the very stereotypes about women that it assiduously asserted were no longer
worthy of consideration and then applied the most narrow legal reasoning to uphold practices that common sense would deem clearly
discriminatory.
During the summer of 1983, the Court decided a Title VII sex
discrimination case which may indicate change to a more realistic
approach to instances of sex discrimination. Ironically, the immediate beneficiaries of the decision were men. This brief article focuses
on that decision, Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Company
v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).7
II. The Court's Decision in Newport News
The question raised in Newport News concerned the validity of
an employer's employee health insurance program. The plan provided hospitalization and medical-surgical coverage for a defined
category of employees and a defined category of employee dependents. The coverage for male and female employees was identical.'
For spouses of employees, the plan "paid in full for a semi-private hospital room for up to 120 days and for surgical procedures;
covered the first $750 of reasonable and customary charges for hospital services . . . ; and paid 80 percent of the charges exceeding

$750 for such services up to a maximum of 120 days." 9 Although for
hospitalization caused by an uncomplicated pregnancy of the wife of
a male employee, the plan paid 100 percent of reasonable and cusright; strict scrutiny applied to statutory classification providing for sterilization for certain
convicted felons).
6. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (Title VII is not violated by the state
of Alabama's refusal to employ women as correctional counselors in male, maximum security
penitentiaries); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977), discussed infra notes 22-29
and accompanying text; General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), discussed infra
notes 15-21 and accompanying text; Phillips v. Martin Marietta, 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (it is at
least arguable that an employer's policy of refusing to employ women with pre-school age
children while employing similarly situated men is justified as a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the employer's business).
7. 103 S. Ct. 2622 (1983).
8. Id. at 2625.
9. Id. at 2625 n.6.

tomary physicians' charges for delivery and anesthesiology, the plan
only covered up to $500 of hospital charges.10 Thus, as the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit observed, "[tio the
extent that the hospital charges in connection with an uncomplicated
delivery may exceed $500 . . . a male employee receives less complete coverage of spousal disabilities than does a female employee." 1
The Supreme Court majority concluded that the fringe benefit
program discriminates against men because "such a practice does
not pass the simple test of whether the evidence shows 'treatment of
a person in a manner which but for that person's sex would be different.' " The test used by the Court to find discrimination was entirely different from that which it previously had used in Title VII
cases dealing with pregnancy. The impetus for the change in analysis
was a 1978 amendment to Title VII, the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act,1" which provides that the terms in Title VII prohibiting discrimination "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include "because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions." ' 14 That amendment was passed in direct response to the
Supreme Court's 1976 decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.'5
Gilbert presented a Title VII challenge to an employer's disability benefit program that provided compensation to employees during
periods of disability resulting from nonoccupational causes. The plan
provided coverage for virtually all disabilities, including those that
were male specific, yet excluded pregnancy and pregnancy-related
disabilities.' The Gilbert majority concluded that such an exclusion
did not violate Title VII because "an exclusion of pregnancy from a
disability-benefits plan providing general coverage is not a genderbased discrimination at all."1 "
Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion, which quoted
with approval a footnote from Geduldig v. Aiello,"8 a case that upheld the constitutionality of excluding pregnancy coverage under the
State of California's insurance program for state employees. The
note stated:
While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does
not follow that every legislative classification concerning preg10.
11.

1982).
12.
435 U.S.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Id.
Newport News Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 667 F.2d 448, 449 (4th Cir.
103 S. Ct. at 2631 n.23 (quoting Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart,
702, 711 (1978)).
Pub. L. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. Il 1979).
429 U.S. 125 (1976).
Id. at 129.
Id. at 136.
417 U.S. 484 (1974).

nancy is a sex-based classification. . . . The program [in question] divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant
women and non-pregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes."
The Court in Gilbert seemed to say that, for discrimination to
occur, the dividing line between favored and disfavored groups must
be drawn strictly on the basis of gender. Since all women were not
affected by the exclusion because some were not pregnant, the dividing line was not drawn strictly on the basis of gender, even though
the affected group was exclusively female.
Justice Stevens' dissent analyzed General Electric's program as
classifying employees into two groups: those who face the risk of
pregnancy, a class composed exclusively of women, and those who
face no such risk, a class consisting entirely of men. 20 Justices Brennan and Marshall's dissent argued that, since the plan provided comprehensive coverage for males but did not provide comprehensive
21
coverage for females, sex discrimination had been established.
The year following Gilbert the Court decided Nashville Gas Co.
v. Satty.2 2 The employer in Satty refused to provide sick leave pay
for women on pregnancy leave, although it did for employees with
other disabilities. The employer also denied women returning from
pregnancy leave all accumulated job seniority, but did not deny seniority to other returning employees.2 With Justice Rehnquist again
writing for the majority, the Court concluded that denial of accrued
seniority violated § 703(a)(2)24 of Title VII. Although it was not on
its face a discriminatory policy, the denial acted to deprive employees of "employment opportunities" and adversely affected their status as employees. 2 In comparing this practice with that in Gilbert,
the Court stated that in Gilbert "[n]o evidence was produced to suggest that men received more benefits from General Electric's disability insurance fund than did women, '26 and in Satty the employer
"has not merely refused to extend to women a benefit that men cannot and do not receive, but has imposed on women a substantial bur19. Id. at 496-97 n.20.
20. 429 U.S. 125, 161-62 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
21. 429 U.S. 125, 152 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
22. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
23. Id. at 138.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976). Section 703(a)(2) provides as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... (2) to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
25. 434 U.S. at 141.
26. Id.

den that men need not suffer." 7
Turning to the denial of sick leave pay to pregnant employees,
the Court said the practice was "legally indistinguishable from the
disability insurance program upheld in Gilbert."28 Additionally, the
program did not "deprive any individual of employment opportunities" or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee in contravention of § 703(a)(2).29 Thus, the denial of sick leave pay did
not violate Title VII.
In 1978 Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in
response to the Gilbert decision. The amendment quite clearly states
that plans like those in Gilbert and Salty no longer are considered
lawful, and the litigants in Newport News so acknowledged. The
problem for the Court, however, was to determine whether the treatment, under the employer's program, of pregnancy related expenses
of employees' spouses was addressed by the amendment. If not, and
the Court analyzed the question as it had in Gilbert and Satty, the
employer's plan would not violate Title VII because the group allegedly discriminated against, male employees with pregnant spouses,
would have to be compared with those receiving benefits, all other
employees with disabled spouses, and the latter class was not exclusively female. Thus, under the Gilbert rationale, no discrimination
against men would have occurred.30 Additionally, if the denial of
sick leave pay to pregnant employees in Salty was not deemed to
adversely affect employment status or to deprive of opportunities,
then it could hardly be said that limiting insurance coverage for
pregnant spouses would violate § 703(a)(2).
The Newport News Court did not conclude specifically that the
language of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act applied to the plan
before it. Instead the Court decided that, although clearly not adding a specific definition of discrimination to Title VII, the amendment was a "rejection of the premises of General Electric v. Gil27. Id. at 142.
28. Id. at 143.
29. Id. at 144-45.
30. See EEOC v. Emerson Electric Co., 539 F. Supp. 153, 158-59 (E.D. Mo. 1982). But
see Note, Dependents' Pregnancy-RelatedMedical Benefits and the PregnancyDiscrimination
Act, 1983 DUKE L.J., 134, 148-49, which suggests that
the two categories of employees to be compared would be married men and married women. Only married male employees would be in the disfavored group and
only married female employees in the favored group because females would receive full coverage for spouses while male employees would not. Therefore, the
plan could be shown to discriminate against males within the affected class of

married persons.
Although at first blush that characterization is plausible, it is not accurate. Those male em-

ployees with spouses unable to bear children would also be in the favored class and the categories would not meet the strict sex-based categorization of favored and disfavored groups required by Gilbert.

bert" which mandated striking the employer's plan. In the Court's
view, "[w]hen Congress amended Title VII in 1978, it unambiguously expressed its disapproval of both the holding and the reasoning
of the Court in the Gilbert decision." ' 2 The amendment was seen as
"not only overturn[ing] the specific holding in General Electric v.
Gilbert . . .but also reject[ing] the test of discrimination employed
by the Court in that case." 3
The Court's conclusion was based on portions of the legislative
history accompanying the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, including a
House Report which stated: "It is the Committee's view that the
dissenting Justices [in Gilbert] correctly interpreted the Act" 4 and
quotations in the Senate Report citing "passages from the two dissenting opinions, stating that they 'correctly express both the principle and the meaning of Title VII.' ,5 The Court also observed that
the issue of differential coverage for dependents had arisen during
congressional deliberations and the Senate Committee "indicated
that it should be resolved on the basis of existing Title VII
principles." 3 6
The test of discrimination applied in Newport News was one
which the Court first had enunciated five years earlier in Los Ange37
les Department of Water & Power v. Manhart:
whether the male
employee with dependents was treated "in a manner which but for
that person's sex would be different." Applying the standard, the
Court determined that the Newport News plan was unlawful because
it "gives married male employees a benefit package for their dependents that is less inclusive than the dependency coverage provided to
married female employees."38 Although the Court recognized that
"[t]he cost of providing complete health insurance coverage for the
dependents of male employees, including pregnant wives, might exceed the cost of providing such coverage for the dependents of female employees," it stated, "[N]o such [cost] justification is recognized under Title VII once discrimination has been shown." 9
Discrimination in the employer's plan was apparent because
[t]he Pregnancy Discrimination Act has now made clear that,
for all Title VII purposes, discrimination based on a woman's
31.
32.
33.
34.

103 S. Ct. at 2632.

Id. at 2628 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2627.
Id. at 2628 (citing HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT OF 1978, at 2 (Comm. Print
1978), reprinted in1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4749, 4750).
35. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1977)).
36. Id. at 2629.
37. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
38. 103 S. Ct. at 2631.
39. Id. at 2632 n.26.

pregnancy is, on its face, discrimination because of her sex. And
since the sex of the spouse is always the opposite of the sex of
the employee, it follows inexorably that discrimination against
female spouses in the provision of fringe benefits is also discrimination against male employees.40
Justice Rehnquist wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined
by Justice Powell. It focused on the language of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and on Justice Rehnquist's perception that congressional intent was to address Gilbert's result only. Justice Rehnquist
argued that the language and spirit of the amendment was addressed
only to pregnant employees and that if Congress had intended to
override the Gilbert Court's mode of analysis regarding discrimination generally, it would have been quite specific in doing so.4 '
IV.

Remaining Issues

When the Court overruled both the holding and reasoning in
Gilbert and Satty, many of the previously unanswered questions
about the applicability of the pregnancy discrimination provision of
Title VII were resolved. The Court accepted the interpretation of the
1978 amendment that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 42 had urged in its guidelines, published soon after the amendment was passed.48 Included in those guidelines were the EEOC's
approach to employer plans which provide different pregnancy benefits for women employees and male employees' wives and that exclude, entirely, nonspousal dependent pregnancy coverage. According to the guidelines, it is not necessary "to provide the same level of
coverage for the pregnancy-related medical conditions of spouses of
male employees as for female employees.""" The critical inquiry is
the level of coverage provided spouse dependents generally. "[T]he
level of coverage for pregnancy-related medical conditions of the
spouses of male employees must be the same as the level of coverage
for all other medical conditions of the spouses of female employees." 45 The guidelines also provide that the pregnancy-related conditions of nonspouse dependents do not have to be covered "as long as
it excludes the pregnancy-related conditions of such non-spouse de40. Id. at 2631.
41. Id. at 2636-37 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
42. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is a federal agency responsible for
implementing Title VII. Although the EEOC does have the authority to promulgate procedural regulations, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1976), it does not have authority to promulgate
substantive regulations. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976) (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975)). EEOC interpretations of substantive
aspects of Title VII neither have the force of law nor supply the basis for imposing liability. Id.
43. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604 app. (1982).
44. Id.
45. Id.

pendents of male and female employees equally."4
While the Court in Newport News did not address directly either type of benefit plan, it provided strong language to support the
conclusion that the EEOC's interpretation will be followed.' 7 Even
though pregnant employees and pregnant spouses may not receive
equal benefits, if spouses of female employees are not fully covered,
there is no difference in treatment of dependents and therefore no
discrimination against employees. Similarly, if nonspousal dependents are excluded from pregnancy coverage, the benefits package is
equally underinclusive for both male and female employees.
Two other conspicuous pregnancy benefits issues were not addressed in Newport News and warrant comment. Section 1604.10(c)
of the EEOC Guidelines provides as follows: "Where the termination
of an employee who is temporarily disabled is caused by an employment policy under which insufficient or no leave is available, such a
termination violates the Act if it has a disparate impact on employees of one sex and is not justified by business necessity.""'
In 1971, the Supreme Court determined that facially neutral
employment practices which have disparate impact on members of
protected groups may establish a prima facie violation of Title VII. 49
Section 1604.10(c) would appear to represent merely an approach
consistent with previously developed Title VII principles. When the
pregnancy amendment was considered, however, it was clear that
Congress did not intend to require employers to institute programs to
provide pregnancy benefits when other employees received no benefits. The House Report specifically states:
[The bill] does not require employers to treat pregnant employees in any particular manner with respect to hiring, permitting
them to continue working, providing sick leave, furnishing medical and hospital benefits, providing disability benefits, or any
other matter. H.R. 6075 in no way requires the institution of
any new programs where none currently exist. The bill would
simply require that pregnant women be treated the same as
other employees on the basis of their ability or inability to
46. Id.
47. See 103 S. Ct. at 2631 n.25.
48. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(c) (1982).
49. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Supreme Court has articulated two alternative analytical modes of establishing a prima facie case of a Title VII violation, the disparate treatment and disparate impact theories. The former involves allegations
that the employer "simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical ....
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 355-56 n.15 (1977). The latter involves "employment
practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but ... in fact fall
more harshly on one group than another ....
Proof of discriminatory motive ... is not required under a disparate- impact theory." Id.

work."'

Later the report stated: "This bill does not require an employer to
have a medical benefit plan."'"
Apparently the congressional intent was to remedy the difference in treatment afforded women disabled by pregnancy and that
afforded employees disabled by other circumstances. If an employer
paid only for a portion of a disabled employee's hospitalization expense, the amendment would not be violated if only a part of preg-

nancy-related hospitalization costs were covered. Similarly, if an employer had no disability benefit plan for employees, failure to
institute one after the effective date of the amendment would not

constitute a violation of Title VII.
Employer provision of insufficient or no leave may have a harsh

effect on pregnant women, and if that impact is substantially greater
than the leave program's impact on men under Section 1604.10(c) of
the Guidelines, a prima facie case of a Title VII violation would be
established. Only a "business necessity" would avoid employer liability. 5 ' In the event of no justifiable business necessity, an employer
hoping to avert Title VII problems might provide a leave program
for pregnant employees or increase the number of days of leave
available to pregnant employees. Yet such activity appears inconsistent with the amendment's history which indicates that similarly situated employees must be treated equally and that no new programs
need be instituted. 8 Can that articulated congressional desire and

disparate impact analysis be reconciled?54
50. H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE &
AD. NEws 4749, 4752.
51. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE & AD. NEws at 4754.
52. Exactly what may constitute a "business necessity" has never been specifically addressed by the Supreme Court. The Court has stated that the burden is on the employer to
show that the practice has "a manifest relation to the employment in question," Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971), or that it bears "a demonstrable relationship to
successful performance of the jobs for which it was used." Id. at 432. A federal district court
asserted that expense and inconvenience to the employer unrelated to job performance does not
establish business necessity. Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 490, 495 (C.D.
Cal. 1971). See also Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98 (1974).
53. See Comment, The Pregnancy DiscriminationAct of 1978 and the EEOC Guidelines: A Return to "Great Deference"?, 41 U. PiTT. L. REV. 735, 757, 758 (1980).
54. A relatively easy reconciliation would be to conclude that fringe benefit programs
may not be subjected to disparate impact analysis, as suggested by Justice Rehnquist in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977), when he distinguished forfeiture of seniority from
a practice of excluding pregnancy from sick leave programs. See supra note 27. As pointed out
by Justice Stevens in that same case,
Differences between benefits and burdens cannot provide a meaningful test of
discrimination since, by hypothesis, the favored class is always benefited, and the
disfavored class is equally burdened. The grant of seniority is a benefit which is
not shared by the burdened class; conversely, the denial of sick pay is a burden
which the benefited class need not bear.
Id. at 154 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring).

There is support for the argument that one of the main concerns
of Congress in asserting that employers would not be required to
institute new programs was minimization of costs. 5 Section
1604.10(c) does not mention compensated leave. If §1604.10(c) is
only applied to situations that fall within its literal terms, it may be
argued that to provide leave or additional leave really will not cost
an employer more, but merely guarantees a pregnant employee a position when she seeks to return to work. Thus, although an employer
may be required to institute a leave program to avoid a disparate
impact on women, the congressional concern for costs is
accommodated.
Whether disparate impact analysis should be applied more generally regarding pregnancy benefits poses an interesting issue. Assume that an employer provides hospitalization insurance which covers 50 percent of hospitalization costs for all employees. If the
employer has a work force which is primarily young and female, it is
likely that this disability program's effect on women as a group
might be considerably greater than its effect on men. More women
than men would be required to rely on personal resources to offset
the costs of the disability, yet the employer would have satisfied the
congressional mandate of treating all employees equally.
The House Report, after discussing concerns with the benefits/
burdens distinctions approach of Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, asserted: "By making clear that distinctions based on pregnancy are
per se violations of Title VII, the bill would eliminate the need in
most instances to rely on the impact approach, and thus would obviate the difficulties in applying the distinctions created in Satty."' "' Is
disparate impact analysis thus inapplicable to pregnancy benefit
plans?
To remove a well developed theory of discrimination analysis
from Title VII would represent a startling change, but may be appropriate. The Supreme Court has said that "[elven a completely
neutral practice will inevitably have some disproportionate impact on
one group or another .

. .

. [T]his Court has never held that dis-

crimination must always be inferred from such consequences. ' 7 In
the area of pregnancy benefits, disparate impact analysis may very
well be inappropriate when financial equal treatment is established.
The pregnancy amendment's second prominent remaining area
of concern involves abortion benefits. The amendment specifically
55. See H.R. REp. No. 948, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
& AD. NEWS 4749; S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
56. H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE &
AD. NEWS 4749.
57. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 n.20 (1978)
(emphasis in original).

provides that an employer is not required to provide "health insurance benefits for abortions except where the life of the mother would
be endangered if the fetus were carried to term, or except where
medical complications have arisen from an abortion.""8 By expressly
excluding health insurance benefits, the amendment can be interpreted logically to indicate that other benefits, for example, sick
leave pay, must be provided for all abortions. 9 Further, the assertion
that nontherapeutic abortions need not be encompassed within a
health insurance plan also implies that therapeutic abortions must be
provided for.6 0
The abortion provisions present several problems. To require an
employer to provide insurance benefits for therapeutic abortions
while not requiring the employer to provide health insurance benefits
for other employees would be inconsistent with the legislative purpose to insure equal treatment. Women would have greater protection than men. The identical argument can be made about requiring
an employer to provide sick leave pay and other nonhealth insurance
benefits to women who have undergone nontherapeutic abortions
when other disabled employees are not similarly compensated.
Just as important is the concern for employers who have sincere
religious beliefs and thus oppose all abortions, but are required by
the statute to provide benefits that may make it easier for such procedures to occur. Such statutory compulsion is arguably contrary to
the free exercise provisions of the first amendment.6 1 Even providing
sick leave or other benefits to employees who have nontherapeutic
abortions may contravene some employers' religious beliefs.
V.

Conclusion

The resolution of these issues undoubtedly will take several
years and perhaps even will require congressional action. Whatever
the outcome, these problems will be intelligently resolved if the decisionmakers demonstrate as much insight as the Newport News majority when it decisively treated sex discrimination in employment as
an evil equivalent to racial discrimination.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. Il 1979). Abortions undertaken when the life or
health of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term will be referred to
as therapeutic abortions. Abortions when the mother's life or health is not threatened will be
referred to as nontherapeutic abortions.
59. This assertion is supported by the EEOC Guidelines. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604 app.

(1982).
60. Id.
61. U.S. CONST. amend. 1. In 1979, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops and
the United States Catholic Conference, Inc. brought an action challenging the abortion provisions of the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimination Act. It was dismissed for failing to present a case
or controversy. National Conference of Catholic Bishops v. Bell, 490 F. Supp. 734 (D.D.C.
1980), affd sub nom. National Conference of Catholic Bishops v. Smith, 653 F.2d 535 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).

